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Casenote

Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts,
Science, and the Constitution

I.

INTRODUCTION

DNA evidence has revolutionized forensic science, making it the
"single greatest advance in the search for truth.., since the advent of
In Williams v. Illinois,2 the United States
cross-examination." 1
Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that there
was no Confrontation Clause violation where experts based their
testimony on another analyst's DNA report that was not admitted into
evidence.3 The Court held an expert may assume the truth of certain
facts-such as a DNA profile contained in a forensic report-to offer
testimony based on those facts without testifying to the truth of the
matter asserted.4 Until Williams, the expert that performed the
forensic tests had to testify at trial to avoid violating the Confrontation

1. Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating Crime Laboratories:The Impact of DNA Evidence, 15
J.L. & POLY 59, 76 (2007) (quoting People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
3. Id. at 2227-28.
4. Id. at 2234-35.
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Clause.' With Williams, the Court attempted to reshape the constitutional lens of scientific confrontation.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The State of Illinois tried the petitioner, Sandy Williams, at a bench
trial for the alleged rape of L.J.6 A Chicago police detective performed
a rape kit on L.J., labeled the kit with an inventory number, and
transported it to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab for chemical testing.
The ISP lab confirmed the presence of semen, prompting the lab to send
a biological sample to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory (Cellmark) in
Germantown, Maryland.7 Cellmark performed forensic testing and
produced a report containing a male DNA profile.'
A forensic specialist, Sandra Lambatos, conducted a computerized
search that compared the Cellmark report's DNA profile with the Illinois
DNA database. The Cellmark report matched a DNA profile from a
blood sample taken from Williams after the police arrested him on an
unrelated charge in August 2000. This DNA match from Lambatos's
search implicated Williams, who was not previously under suspicion for
L.J.'s rape. As a result of this match, the police conducted a physical
lineup where L.J. picked Williams as her assailant.9
The indictment charged Williams with aggravated criminal sexual
assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. Williams
waived his rigjit to a jury trial. In April 2006, L.J. identified Williams
as her attacker during the bench trial, and the prosecutor produced
three expert witnesses. First, Brian Hapack testified as the ISP forensic
scientist who performed the rape kit and confirmed the presence of
semen on L.J.'s vaginal swabs through an acid phosphatase test.
Second, Karen Abbinanti testified as the state forensic analyst who

5. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317-20 (2009); Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713-14 (2011).
6. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.
7. Id. Justice Kagan notes in her dissent that Cellmark had a contract with the Illinois
State Police Department, finding it odd that no other Justices took notice of that fact. Id.
at 2276 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See alsoJanet C. Hoeffel, The Dark Side ofDNA Profiling:
Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the CriminalDefendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 471
(1990) ("Three commercial laboratories and the FBI currently perform the DNA profiling
test to aid in identifying criminal suspects. Lifecodes Corporation, Cellmark Diagnostics,
and the FBI."); Id. at n.30 ("Cellmark has the exclusive North American license to market
[Dr. Alec] Jeffreys's technique[,] [who is the man typically credited for linking forensic
science to DNA analysis]. The company opened in 1987 and obtained the first death
penalty conviction in the United States based on the [DNA] evidence.").
8. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2229.

9. Id.
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developed the DNA profile from Williams's blood sample through
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Short Tandem Repeat (STR)
techniques, which she entered into the Illinois DNA database. Third,
Sandra Lambatos testified as the analyst who compared the Cellmark
°
report with the DNA proffles from the Illinois DNA database.
Defense counsel objected during Lambatos's testimony referencing the
report generated by Cellmark, which was not admitted into evidence or
evaluated by the judge as factfinder." Lambatos never quoted, read,
or identified the report as the source of her expert opinion. Specifically,
Lambatos testified that it is "commonly accepted" within the scientific
community for "one DNA expert to rely on the records of another DNA
expert." 12 After being shown the shipping manifest entered into
evidence as business records, Lambatos testified those records indicated
that the ISP lab sent L.J.'s sample to Cellmark, and Celmark sent the
3
sample back with a DNA profile.' The prosecutor then asked Lambatos whether "a computer match" existed between "the male DNA profile
found in the semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.]" and "[the] male
DNA profile that had been identified."" Defense counsel objected for
lack of foundation because no evidence of the Cellmark report had been
admitted into evidence; however, the judge agreed with the prosecutor
that Lambatos was not "getting at what another lab did," but merely
5
testifying about "her own testing based on [DNA] information."
Defense counsel moved to exclude Lambatos's testimony about
Cellmark as a violation of the Confrontation Clause because no evidence
existed to justify Lambatos's testimony with respect to any work or
6
analysis performed by Cellmark.' Conversely, the prosecutor claimed

10. Id. at 2229-30. Lambatos testified to matters of forensic biology and DNA analysis,
procedures of using PCR and STR techniques, and the comparisons between the two DNA
profiles implicating Williams. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 2230. Lambatos also testified that Cellmark was accredited, the analyst
relied on sealed shipping containers and shipping manifests, and the ISP routinely used
Cellmark to examine evidence sent via Federal Express to expedite scientific testing and
reduce backlogs at the ISP lab. Id.
14. Id. (alterations in original).
15. Id. (alteration in original). Defense counsel objected to the form of the question
when the prosecution asked, "Did you compare the semen that had been identified by Brian
Hapack from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to the male DNA profile that had been identified
by Karen [Abbinanti] from the blood of [petitioner]?" Id. (alterations in original). The
judge overruled this objection. Defense counsel also objected when Lambatos answered
"yes" to whether she could "call this a match to [petitioner]?" Id. (alteration in original).
Again, the judge overruled this objection. Id.
16. Id. at 2231.
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that the Confrontation Clause had been satisfied because Williams had
the opportunity to cross-examine Lambatos who, pursuant to Illinois
Rule of Evidence 703,"7 merely testified to the match between DNA
profiles."8 Again, the trial judge agreed with the prosecution. 9
The trial court found Williams guilty of all charges. The Illinois Court
of Appeals affirmed because the Cellmark report was not entered into
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Illinois Supreme
Court also affirmed, noting the Cellmark report was used for the basis
of Lambatos's testimony." The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari."'
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Confrontation Clause: Rights, History, and Relationship with
Evidence
The Confrontation Clause serves as a procedural guarantee for both
federal and state criminal defendants.22 The foundation for the clause
became rooted in the Constitution after notorious trials in England,
namely that of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason," and after controversial

17. ILL. R. EVID. 703. Illinois Rule of Evidence 703 is consistent with Federal Rule of
Evidence 703. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has
been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field
would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the
facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may
disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate
the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
Id.
18. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2231.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2231-32.
21. Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
22. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
23. Id. at 44 ("The most notorious instancen ... occurred in the great political trials
of the 16th and 17th centuries. One such was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for
treason. Lord Cobham, Raleigh's alleged accomplice, had implicated him in an examination
before the Privy Council and in a letter. At Raleigh's trial, these were read to the jury.
Raleigh argued that Cobham had lied to save himself. 'Cobham is absolutely in the King's
mercy; to excuse me cannot avail him; by accusing me he may hope for favour.' 1 D.
JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRiALs 435 (1832). Suspecting that Cobham would recant, Raleigh
demanded that the judges call him to appear, arguing that '[t]he Proof of the Common Law
is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my
face .... .' 2 How. St. Tr., at 15-16. The judges refused, id., at 24, and, despite Raleigh's
protestations that he was being tried 'by the Spanish Inquisition,' id., at 15, the jury
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examination practices in the colonies left the Founders afraid of the
government's ability to use ex parte communications against the
In fact, the right to
defendant without face-to-face confrontation.'
right at ratifying
fundamental
a
such
be
to
confront was deemed
responded by
Congress
First
the
that
Constitution
the
conventions for
including the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.2 6
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution states that "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with
27
the witnesses against him."2" In Crawford v. Washington, the Court
articulated the modem Confrontation Clause standard when it held that
out-of-court testimonial statements made by witnesses violate the
Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.'
Crawford was convicted of assault after attacking and stabbing a man
who allegedly tried to rape his wife. At trial, the wife did not testify due
to the spousal privilege, but the prosecution played a tape recording of
her prior statement. The wife's tape-recorded statement corroborated
Crawford's story except for his self-defense theory. Each level of the
state courts in Crawford used different tests to indicate the reliability
of evidence to find that the tape recording did not violate Crawford's
Sixth Amendment rights. 29 The Supreme Court reversed, dispensing
with the reliability standard, and found that the wife's statements were
testimonial and thus in violation of the Confrontation Clause.30

convicted, and Raleigh was sentenced to death. One of Raleigh's trial judges later
lamented that 'the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh.' 1 Jardine, supra, at 520.").
24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-50.

25. Id. at 48-49. Abraham Holmes objected to the omission of the Confrontation Clause
in a proposed version of the Constitution, stating the following.
The mode of trial is altogether indetermined;..

. whether

[the defendant] is to be

allowed to confront the witnesses, and have the advantage of cross-examination,
we are not yet told ....[We shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling
them to institute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in
Spain,... the Inquisition.

Id. (alterations in original); An Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym Federal
Farmer stated: "Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [ofi witnesses, and
generally before the triers of the facts in question .... [Wiritten evidence... [is] almost
useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper
discovery of truth." Id. at 49 (alterations in original).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
28. Id. at 59, 68.
29. Id. at 38-42.
30. Id. at 68-69.
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Crawford overruled the leading precedent of Ohio v. Roberts,3 which
allowed out-of-court testimony if it fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" and bore adequate "indicia of reliability."32 The Roberts
standard allowed more evidence to be admitted into trial against
defendants through hearsay exceptions and rules of evidence while also
granting the judge discretion to determine reliability.3 However, the
Court in Crawford explained that "[wihere testimonial statements are
involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much
less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.'" '
Instead, the Court explained that reliability is not determined by a judge's discretion, but
instead by the Constitution's guarantee of "confrontation" and the
"crucible of cross-examination." 35
Although the Court in Crawford failed to conclusively define testimony,36 it attempted to provide examples of what, at a minimum, qualified
as testimony-such as police interrogations and testimony at preliminary
hearings, grand jury proceedings, or former trials.
The Court
determined that testimony could not be admitted because the questioner,
like the police in Crawford, served as a neutral party to not untruthfully
change a witness's testimony. 38
Since Crawford, the Court has continued to determine the limits of
testimony and when it is used to establish the truth of the matter
asserted. In Davis v. Washington,39 the Court held a victim's statement
in response to a 911 operator's interrogation was not testimonial and not
subject to the Confrontation Clause when taken during a domestic
violence disturbance. ° However, in Hammon v. Indiana,4 the Court

31. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
32. Id. at 66.
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-65.
34. Id. at 61.
35. Id. ("To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but
it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible
of cross-examination.").
36. Id. at 68 ("We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive
definition of 'testimonial.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 66 ("The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could
be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by 'neutral' government
officers.").
39. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
40. Id. at 822.
41. 547 U.S. 813(2006). The Court addressed Davis and Hammon in the same opinion.
Id. at 817.
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held a domestic violence victim's statement, given in an affidavit to a
police officer when the victim was separated from the abuser, was
42
testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. The Court wrote Davis
and Hammon together in an attempt to explain the distinction between
statements given during an emergency and statements given to
implicate the accused of a crime.43 In Michigan v. Bryant," the Court
further explained the meaning of testimonial, holding that a shooting
victim's statements to police were not testimony that implicated the
Confrontation Clause when removed from the shooter and the emergency
of the crime.4 5 Instead, the victim's statements implicated the rules of
was not to give
evidence because the objective "primary purpose"
4
emergency.
ongoing
an
end
to
but
testimony,
B. Expert Testimony About Forensic Reports and the Confrontation
Clause
47 the Court confronted the issue
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
of whether affidavits reporting forensic evidence are "testimonial" and
4
whether the affiants are "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause. "
After police arrested Melendez-Diaz with two other men, an officer
noticed the men making furtive movements in the police car. A
subsequent search of the car revealed a plastic bag containing nineteen
smaller bags hidden between the front and back seats. Chemical tests
confirmed the bags contained cocaine, and Melendez-Diaz was charged
with distributing and trafficking cocaine. 4' At trial, the prosecution
admitted certificates, sworn before a notary by analysts as required by
law, to establish "[t]he substance was found to contain: Cocaine."'
Melendez-Diaz objected, claiming the certificates violated his Sixth

42. Id. at 822.
43. Id. at 821-22.
44. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
45. Id. at 1150.
46. Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). Justice Sotomayor delivered the majority
opinion of the Court, joined by the concurrence of Justice Thomas, where she noted this
was the first post-Crawfordcase that involved a gun that was a threat to the public, falling
outside of a domestic violence case, and limiting the reach of Crawford. Id. at 1156.
Justice Thomas remained consistent with his Confrontation Clause opinions, stating
testimonial statements should be formal and have "solemnity." Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia wrote a strongly-worded dissent accusing the majority of
crafting tales to misconstrue the clear application of modern Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, leaving the Crawfordrule in "shambles." Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
48. Id. at 307.
49. Id. at 308.
50. Id.
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Amendment rights under Crawfordwhich required the analyst to testify
in person.5 '
The Supreme Court held that these certificates qualified as affidavits,
so the Confrontation Clause required the analyst to testify in person and
face the "crucible of cross-examination." 2 The Court stated that
analysts did not avoid confrontation on the theory that they were not
"accusatory" or "conventional" Witnesses.53 Analysts were not excused
because their testimony consisted of "neutral, scientific testing."5 4
Forensic testing also did not qualify as or resemble business records.5 5
The Court stated the Confrontation Clause burden was on the prosecution; thus, the defendant's ability to subpoena a forensic analyst did not
eliminate the prosecution's obligation to produce the analyst for crossexamination.56
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico,57 the Supreme Court addressed
whether "the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce
a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification ...
through U in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the
certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification."5" Bullcoming was arrested for driving under the influence of
alcohol. At trial, the prosecution attempted to admit into evidence a
"Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis" (RBAA)."9 The expert who testified
for the prosecution had not performed the tests,6" which defense
counsel objected to at trial because it affected trial strategy and violated
Bullcoming's Confrontation Clause rights.6 '
The Supreme Court in Builcoming held that the defendant had a right
to confront the analyst who certified the RBAA. 2 Its rationale rested
on the notion that the obvious reliability of a testimonial statement does
not escape the Confrontation Clause and cross-examination because
"surrogate testimony" could not convey what the analyst who performed

51. Id. at 309.
52. Id. at 310-11; see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
53. 557 U.S. at 315-17.
54. Id. at 317.
55. Id. at 321-24.
56. Id. at 324-25.
57. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
58. Id. at 2710.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2711-12. Curtis Caylor performed the testing and could not testify because
he was recently "put on unpaid leave." Id.
61. Id. at 2712.
62. Id. at 2710.
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the test knew or observed.' Additionally, the Court held the report
was testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because the analyst
made a certified and formalized report in accordance with law to assist
the police, which fell into the core class of testimonial statements
recognized by the Confrontation Clause cases." Thus, the Court made
clear through Melendez-Diaz and Bulcoming that prosecutors who admit
forensic reports into evidence mist produce the analyst who performed
the forensic testing to avoid violating the Confrontation Clause.65
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In Williams, a divided Supreme Court held that an expert's reliance
on a DNA report prepared by another analyst did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.66 Justice Alito, writing the plurality opinion,
framed the issues as: 1) whether "Crawford bar[s] an expert from
expressing an opinion based on facts.., that have been made known to
the expert[,] but about which the expert is not competent to testify;" and
2) "whether Crawford substantially impedes the ability of prosecutors to
introduce DNA evidence." 7
Plurality
The Court in Williams held that an expert's testimony does not violate
the Confrontation Clause where the testimony does not discuss the
truthfulness of the relied-upon report.6 8 Justice Alito explained that it
is historically accepted that experts may base their opinion on facts
when the expert lacks first-hand knowledge.69 Modern rules of
evidence permit expert testimony that relies on basis evidence where the
expert lacks personal knowledge because "such reliance does not
constitute admissible evidence of [the] underlying information." 0
Given these accepted principles of evidence, Justice Alito explained that
Lambatos did not testify to the truth of any matter asserted in

A.

63. Id. at 2710, 2715-16. ("We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not
meet the constitutional requirement. The accused's right is to be confronted with the
analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the
accused had aIn opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular scientist.").
64. Id. at 2717.
65. Id.
66. 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
67. Id. at 2227.
68. Id. at 2235.
69. Id. at 2233.
70. Id. at 2234 (discussing how the modem rules of evidence dispense with the need
for the historical use of hypothetical questions while still allowing for opinions to be based
upon facts about which the expert lacks personal knowledge). See also FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Cellmark's DNA report.7 Lambatos neither vouched for the quality of
the report nor the work done at Cellmark's lab, as Lambatos only
referenced the Cellmark report to state that she compared the report to
the Illinois DNA database.72
The Court distinguished Williams from Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts7 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 74 where the prosecution admitted forensic reports into evidence for the purpose of establishing the
truth of the matter each report asserted to prove. 75 Explaining this
distinction, the plurality again noted that Lambatos merely used the
Cellmark report for the purpose of DNA comparison, which was the
substance of her testimony and subject to cross-examination, and would
not open the door to a floodgate of abuses that diminish defendants'
76
rights.
Further, Justice Alito distinguished Lambatos's expert testimony
because the factfinder understood the limited purpose of the underlying
basis evidence.77 This distinction treats expert testimony differently in
jury and bench trials because it is presumed the judge will understand
the limited use of the expert's opinion," whereas a jury may be
influenced regardless of a limiting instruction for the report.7" Here,
the Cellmark report was not admitted into evidence or submitted to the
factfinder, and the factfinder was a judge who understood the limited
use of basis evidence in the bench trial."0 As a result, the plurality
determined that Lambatos merely relied on the Celimark report, and the
judge was not confused or misguided by her testimony.'
Alternatively, Justice Alito stated that "[elven if the Cellmark report
had been introduced for its truth,. . . there was no Confrontation Clause
violation [because] [tihe Confrontation Clause refers to testimony by

71. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2235.
72. Id. at 2235-36.
73. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
74. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
75. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2240.

substance in question was cocaine.

In Melendez-Diaz, the certificates proved the

Id.

In Bullcoming, the report proved that the

defendant's blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit. Id.
76. Id. at 2240-41.
77. Id. at 2231-32.
78. Id. at 2235.
79. Id. at n.2; see Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 417 (1985) (holding that jurors
could hear accomplice's confession that was clearly testimonial for the "distinctive and
limited purpose" of comparing to the defendant's confession to determine whether the two
were identical).
80. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2236-37.
81. Id.
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'witnesses against' an accused." 2 Further, although the reports in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming implicated the Confrontation Clause, the
e3
Court has never held that all forensic reports fall into that catgory
Considering the objective primary purpose, Justice Alito explained that
the primary purpose of the Cellmark DNA report was not to accuse or
to create evidence against Williams, who was not in police custody or
under suspicion, but rather to capture a dangerous rapist who posed a
threat to the public.8 ' Since numerous lab technicians work on each
DNA profile without any indication as to whether their work will
incriminate or exonerate an individual, forensic DNA reports prepared
by a modern, accredited laboratory do not resemble the historical
5
Thus, the
practices associated with the Confrontation Clause.
plurality explained that if a statement, such as a DNA report, is not
made for "'the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for
trial testimony,' its admissibility 'is the concern of state and federal rules
88
of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause."'
B.

Concurrences

Justice Breyer, writing a concurring opinion, stated that the Court had
not addressed a difficult and important question: "[hiow does the
Confrontation Clause apply to the panoply of crime laboratory reports
and underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made by)
laboratory technicians? In [that] context, what, if any, are the outer
limits of the 'testimonial statements"' from Crawford?7 Justice Breyer
would have rescheduled the case for oral argument to address the
broader issues, but believed DNA reports fall outside the scope of the
8
Confrontation Clause and thus concurred with the plurality's opinion.

82. Id. at 2242. However, the Court has consistently declined to adopt the narrow view
that "witnesses against" refers only to persons who testify in court. Id. In fact, Justice
Alito noted two out-of-court abuses that prompted the Confrontation Clause's creation: 1)
"out-of-court statements having the primary purpose of accusing" a person of criminal
conduct; and 2) "formalized statements such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or
confessions." Id.
83. Id. at 2243.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2244.
86. Id. at 2243 (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155); see also Hammon, 547 U.S. at 822
(holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply when made "under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.").
87. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244-45 (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2245.
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Justice Thomas, also writing a concurrence, joined the plurality's
decision that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in result only
because "Cellmark's statements lacked the requisite 'formality and
solemnity' to be considered 'testimonial' for purposes of the Confrontation Clause." 9 Despite joining the plurality, Justice Thomas disagreed
with the plurality opinion's underlying premise, finding that the
Cellmark report was used for*the truth of the matter asserted.'
Specifically, the ability of the factfinder (the judge) to rely on other
evidence when evaluating an expert opinion (Lambatos) does not change
the conclusion that the basis testimony (Cellmark report) was used for
its truth.91 Finding the primary purpose test unworkable,9 2 Justice
Thomas wrote that testimonial statements must meet the formality
requirement, which distinguished the DNA report in Williams from the
testimony of certificates in Melendez-Diaz and the signed statement in
Bullcoming.9 3
C.

Dissent
Justice Kagan-joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayorwrote the dissent under the premise that the Court had previously
decided this issue in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.94 Noting a
previous case where Cellmark mistakenly identified a defendant but
corrected the mistake on cross-examination, 95 the dissent explained

89. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167).
90. Id. at 2256.
91. Id. at 2258.
92. Id. at 2262 ("The shortcomings of the original primary purpose test pale in
comparison, however, to those plaguing the reformulated version that the plurality
suggests today. The new primary purpose test asks whether an out-of-court statement has
'the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct.'
That test lacks any grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic.") (citation
omitted).
93. Id. at 2260-61.
94. Id. at 2264-66 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I call Justice [Alitol's opinion 'the plurality,'
because that is the conventional term for it. But in all except its disposition, his opinion
is a dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every aspect of its reasoning and every
paragraph of its explication .... That creates five votes to approve the admission of the
Cellmark report, but not a single good explanation. The plurality's first rationale endorses
a prosecutorial dodge; its second relies on distinguishing indistinguishable forensic reports.
Justice [Thomas]'s concurrence, though positing an altogether different approach, suffers
in the end from similar flaws. I would choose another path-to adhere to the simple rule
established in our decisions, for the good reasons we have previously given. Because
defendants like Williams have a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against
them, I respectfully dissent from the Court's fractured decision.").
95. Id. at 2264 ("Some years ago, the State of California prosecuted a man named John
Kocak for rape. At a preliminary hearing, the State presented testimony from an analyst
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that numerous forensic mishaps and the Court's precedent established
that Crawford reached forensic reports.9" According to the dissent, the
Court also previously rejected the notion that scientific evidence was
presumptively neutral, reliable, or immune to the risk of manipulation,
so forensic reports must also face the "crucible of cross-examination" to
comply with Crawford.9" Justice Kagan reiterated that "surrogate"
witnesses, who testify in place of the analyst who performed and
produced the report, do not satisfy the Confrontation Clause.98 Thus,
Lambatos provided the equivalent of surrogate testimony because she
could not testify to what the actual analyst performed in the Cellmark
DNA report.99
According to the dissent, unlike evidence that conforms to a limiting
instruction, "the out-of-court statement in [a forensic] context has no
purpose separate from its truth. " "°° The dissent found the plurality's
reasoning-allowing the prosecution to dress testimony in scientific
clothing and introduce it to the factfinder without cross-examination-prevented the defendant from confronting the witness who made
the report and allowed the prosecution to circumvent the Confrontation
Clause.101

at the Ceimark Diagnostics Laboratory-the same facility used to generate DNA evidence
in this case. The analyst had extracted DNA from a bloody sweatshirt found at the crime
scene and then compared it to two control samples--one from Kocak and one from the
victim. The analyst's report identified a single match: As she explained on direct
examination, the DNA found on the sweatshirt belonged to Kocak. But after undergoing
cross-examination, the analyst realized she had made a mortifying error. She took the
stand again, but this time to admit that the report listed the victim's control sample as
coming from Kocak, and Kocak's as coming from the victim. So the DNA on the sweatshirt
matched not Kocak, but the victim herself.... Our Constitution contains a mechanism
for catching such errors-the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.").
96. Id. at 2264-65.
97. Id. at 2266 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 305) (comparing to Melendez-Diaz
where the testimonial statements functioned as affidavits).
98. Id. (comparing to Bullcoming where the prosecution produced the supervisor as
a surrogate witness to testify regarding the BAC of defendant because the original analyst
was on unpaid leave).
99. Id. at 2267.
100. Id. at 2269.
101. Id. Justice Kagan noted, "If the Confrontation Clause prevents the State from
getting its evidence in through the front door, then the State could sneak it in through the
back. What a neat trick-but really, what a way to run a criminal justice system. No
wonder five Justices reject it." Id. at 2272. Justice Kagan explained this error: as nothing
in Lambatos's testimony indicates she made an assumption, but instead made an
affirmation without qualifications that the Cellmark report accurately showed a male DNA
profile from L.J.'s vaginal swabs, it allowed the prosecution to avoid subjecting the witness
to cross-examination. Id.
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The dissent also chastised the plurality's distinction regarding the
factfinder's identity. °2
Justice Kagan stated that regardless of
whether the jury or judge makes factual determinations, testimonial
statements violate the Confrontation Clause when the defendant does
not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 10 3 By not
requiring the analyst who performed forensic tests to testify, defendants
can no longer constitutionally test through confrontation the forensic
report's reliability or the analyst's competence, which are important in
cases like Williams, where forensic evidence largely contributed to the
prosecution. '"

Further, Justice Kagan wrote that Cellmark did not create the report
for the primary purpose of helping police with the ongoing emergency of
finding a dangerous rapist. 10 5 She stated that the primary purpose
from trial testimony showed "all reports in this case were prepared for
this criminal investigation ... [aind for the purpose of the eventual

litigation."0 6 The timeline also disproved an emergency because the
police did not send the sample for nine months after the rape and did
07
not receive the DNA results for another four months.
V.

IMPLICATIONS: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, &

How

A.

Who Does This Affect? Defense, Prosecution, Courts-Everyone?
The divided decision in Williams illustrates the difficulties of applying
the Confrontation Clause test from Crawford v. Washington'0 8 to the
realities of scientific expert testimony. Further, the Court's inability to
author a consistent opinion or constitutional rule affects each party at
the trial level.

102. Id. at 2271.
103. Id. ("[Wihether a factfmder is confused by an error is a separate question from
whether an error has occurred.").
104. Id. at 2274-75 ("But surely the typical problem with laboratory analyses-and the
typical focus of cross-examination-has to do with careless or incompetent work, rather
than with personal vendettas. And as to that predominant concern, it makes not a whit
of difference whether, at the time of the laboratory test, the police already have a
suspect.").
105. Id. at 2274.
106. Id. (alteration in original).
107. Id. In addition, Justice Kagan also disagreed with the plurality's alternative
holding that the Cellmark report was not testimonial and would not implicate the
Confrontation Clause even if used for the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 2273-75. The
dissent stated, "the report [was], in every conceivable respect, a statement meant to serve
as evidence in a potential criminal trial." Id. at 2275.
108. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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At the center, judges must decide which precedent controls an expert's
testimony, making the procedural use of forensic evidence significant."0 9 Currently, the Williams opinion distinguishes itself on so
many factors that courts may now have to consider: the type of report,
laboratory accreditation, factfinder identity, and wording of examination
questions." ° The format of questioning becomes a point of contention
for trial counsel and judges at both trial and appellate levels to
determine when forensic reports serve as basis evidence versus
truth."' Thus, while trial judges maintain judicial discretion and are
typically in the best position to evaluate expert testimony,11 2 a consistent application of Williams is unlikely.
Prosecutors may also be hesitant or see no reason why forensic reports
should be admitted into evidence because the content of those reports
can reach the factfinder through the "back" door. 3 Additionally
problematic is the distinction between factfinders, forcing prosecutors to
produce experts of basis evidence in jury trials or argue that the
distinction in Williams is irrelevant since a jury could follow a limiting
instruction."" Considering the varying factors relied upon in Williams, prosecutors may actually have to call analysts for each DNA
report to ensure their convictions are not reversed.
Williams also affects the defense at trial as it limits the defense
counsel's ability to adequately prepare, cross-examine, and effectively
counsel defendants. 5 Williams treats DNA basis evidence as inherently reliable; without confrontation, the defense loses an adversarial tool. 6

109. Judges must now decide whether prosecutors submit expert testimony and forensic
evidence under the Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming line of reasoning, or whether it is
submitted under the Williams line of reasoning.
110. 132 S. Ct. at 2235-40.
111. Now prosecutors and defense counsel may play word games in court when
questioning experts. See id. at 2236.
112. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (discussing
the trial judge as a gatekeeper when looking to Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
113. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
114. Justice Kagan noted that the Court has never considered factfmder identity in any
of its previous Confrontation Clause cases. Id. at 2271.
115. Eric Breslin, The Supreme Court Speaks and a Clarified Area of the Law ...
Becomes a Little Less Clear: The Confrontation Clause and Williams v. Illinois, DuANE
MoRRis BLOGS (Oct. 22, 2012), http://blogs.duanemorris.com/duanemorriswhitecollarcrim
inallawblog/entry/the-supreme-courtspeaksand
(noting the Williams decision
disadvantages the defendant).
116. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (announcing the current standard for assessing
scientific evidence, expressing confidence in "the capabilities of the jury and of the
adversary system generally," and in "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof' to protect defendants against
faulty or fraudulent scientific evidence).
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What Are the Costs-Economic or Constitutional?

State and forensic laboratories are already under budget strains that
contribute to outdated equipment, testing backlog, and diminished
staff. 7 Despite budget constraints, operating forensic laboratories is
an expensive endeavor for the government with average annual
operating costs in the billions."'
Requiring the State to produce
potentially dozens of analysts increases complexity and cost to a degree
that would reduce laboratory DNA testing and force prosecutors to forego
DNA testing by relying on less reliable forms of evidence."'
These costs are not only economic but constitutional. Confrontation is
a constitutional right that should not be influenced by "amorphous
notions of 'reliability"' applied to science. 120 Forensic scandals littered
with perjured forensic testimony occur in many states, such as West
121
Virginia, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and recently Massachusetts.
Conversely, DNA and forensic evidence have had extremely positive
effects on our justice system when used correctly-including exonerating
184 alleged convicts by 2006 through DNA testing, and finding one of
the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center attack through DNA
testing from saliva on a letter mailed to the New York 7mes.122 Thus,
the constitutional cost of the Williams approach implicates notions of
criminal justice that are difficult to measure.

117. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 87-88.
118. Matthew R. Durose, Kelly A. Walsh & Andrea M. Burch, Census of Publicly
Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2009, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 10 (2009) (noting the
annual operating budget for laboratories was an average 1.6 billion dollars).
119. Williams rejected the every analyst rule posed by the Petitioner, saving significant
costs to the state. 132 S.Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Brief of New York
County District Attorney's Office and the New York City Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221
(2012) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 5125054 at *10).
120. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. Further, this cornerstone of Crawford seemingly
contradicts the plurality in Williams, which discusses the reliability of DNA evidence.
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228.
121. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 86.
122. Id. at 85-86; see also United States v. Sahneh, 152 F.3d 88, 129 (2d Cir. 1998).
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C. When Is Testimony For Truth-When Must Experts Testify For
Truth?
Although Crawfordbars out-of-court testimony introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted,"2 establishing what is testimonial and
what is the truth of the matter asserted is potentially difficult. Here,
this difficult issue is central to 'vhether base testimony can consist of
forensic reports or whether the nature of forensic reports solely rests on
its truth."M Given the Supreme Court's difficulty in determining this
question of truth of the matter asserted, lower courts have no guidance
for when forensic testimony requires confrontation.'2 5 Thus, trial
judges and counsel must discern the constitutional protections involving
forensic reports.
D. Where Are Forensic Laboratoriesand DNA Evidence Today?
Unfortunately, the accreditation of forensic laboratories remains
voluntary, increasing to 83% in 2009,126 and there is no national
standard for expert qualifications.'2 ' This results in various scandals,

123. Charles Alan Wright, Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Victor James Gold & Michael H.
Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: HEARSAY, 30 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid.
§ 6324 (1st ed. 2012); see, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
124. Compare Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2234-35, with id. at 2268-69 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) ("[To determine the validity of the witness's conclusion, the factfmder must
assess the truth of the out-of-court statement on which it relies. That is why the principal
modern treatise on evidence variously calls the idea that such 'basis evidence' comes in not
for its truth, but only to help the factfinder evaluate an expert's opinion 'very weak,'
'factually implausible,' 'nonsense,' and 'sheer fiction.'... 'One can sympathize,' notes [the]
treatise, 'with a court's desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is quite
probably reliable, such as a routine analysis of a drug, but to pretend that it is not being
introduced for the truth of its contents strains credibility.'") (citing D. KAYE, D. BERNSTEIN,
& J. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 4.10.1, 196-197 (2d ed. 2011); id.

at 4.11.6,; id. at 24 (Supp. 2012); id. at 4.10.1.; id. at 198 (2d ed. 2011)).
125. This is also demonstrated by the fractured opinion and the irony that five of the
Justices wrote in opposition to the new binding plurality standard that forensic base
testimony is not given for the truth of the matter asserted. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264-65
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
126. Durose et al., supra note 118, at 1.
127. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 747 (2007) ("The lack of
meaningful peer review not only stunts the methodological growth of forensic science, but
also enables forensic science to evade the stringent quality control standards imposed on
most scientific endeavors. Many forensic laboratories fail to adhere to even basic
monitoring standards: they do not engage in validation studies or undertake routine
proficiency testing, and those that do tend to shroud their results in secrecy rather than
publish them publicly as in other scientific disciplines. In the oft-quoted words of one
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such as the "Ves Phenomenon" and "Cinderella" evidence."~ Understanding these issues began when forensic evidence laboratories were
created in the early 1920s, 129 adopted by the FBI in the early 1930s, 3 ° and gained acceptance through high-profile cases, such as the St.
Valentine's Day Massacre' 3' and the Lindbergh kidnapping. 3 2 As
a result of the forensic truth-seeking potential, laboratories developed
around the nation on a state and federal level in subsequent decades
without the benefit of national planning or discretion. 33 Courts
decided issues of admissibility' and reliability'3 5 of forensic evidence, but the admissibility wars "highlighted the need for a more
scientific approach to forensic evidence" testing. 36 Deficiencies in

renowned scientist, 'clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be allowed to
diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row.'")
(quoting Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprintingon Trial, 339 NATuRE 501, 505 (1989)).

128. Paul C. GianneUi, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in CriminalCases: The Need
for Independent Crime Laboratories,4 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 439, 442 (1997).
129. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 61-62 ("August Vollmer, sometimes known as the
'father' of modern policing in America, crated the [first crime] laboratory during his brief
tenure as Chief of Police in Los Angeles.").
130. Id. at 63-64 ("J. Edgar Hoover began the Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI')
crime laboratory in 1932 .... 'During its first month of service, the FBI Laboratory
examiners handled 20 cases. In its first full year of operation, the volume increased to a
total of 963 examinations. By the next year that figure more than doubled.' ...
Handwriting comparisons, the examination of various types of trace evidence (e.g., hairs,
fibers, soils), and serological testing of blood and semen would be added later.").
131. Id. at 62-63 ("Colonel Calvin Goddard, who maintained an independent firearms
laboratory in New York ... analyz[ed] the crime scene bullets and cartridge cases.
Goddard tested and excluded all police-issued Thompson submachine guns... seized from
the home of Fred Burke, a suspect in the killings. It was later learned that a rival gang,
headed by Al Capone, instigated the murders. A member of the coroner's jury was so
impressed with Goddard's work that he offered to fund a crime lab.").
132. Id. at 64-65 ("ITihe extensive use of handwriting comparison testimony at the
Lindbergh kidnapping trial in 1935 solidified the role of the crime lab in the criminal
justice system.").
133. Id. at 66-67.
134. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (first reported
case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence).
135. People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
136. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 81.
[T]he court wrote: "In a piercing attack upon each molecule of evidence presented,
the defense was successful in demonstrating to this court that the testing
laboratory failed in its responsibility to perform the accepted scientific techniques
and experiments."... "[Tihe DNA data in this case are not scientifically reliable
enough to support the assertion that the samples.., do or do not match. If this
data were submitted to a peer reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, it
would not be accepted. Further experimentation would be required."
Id. at 79 (quoting Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996).
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forensic reliability and laboratory budgets plagued the use of forensic
evidence.' 37 Congress attempted to control the situation by passing
the DNA Identification Act of 1994.138 The American Bar Association
has also addressed deficiencies. 139 Yet, after almost a century of using
forensic evidence, the Court still attempts to define the use of DNA
evidence in trials without discussing the issues facing forensic laborato-

ries.

140

With respect to forensic reports and analysts, each forensic report
involves layers of technical statements made by one analyst and relied
Multiple technicians and analysts that work on
upon by another.'
a single DNA test and some specialists may only have one job in the
143
142
While the Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
analytical process.
and Bulicoming v. New Mexico'" logic suggested that every forensic
expert must testify, Williams narrows the rule by suggesting that lab
reports involving multiple steps, such as the Celmark report, are part
of an internal work product that will generally not be classified as
testimonial. 145

137. Id. at 67-68. President Lyndon B. Johnson instituted a Crime Commission on
police that found local laboratories do not have the budget for personnel or equipment to
ensure the proximity, timeliness and quality of laboratory service. Little has changed in
modern laboratories since 1967. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006).
139. See ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3. 1(a). The ABA Criminal Justice Standards
were adopted in 2006. The standards regulate: the collection, preservation, and retention
of biological evidence; pretrial disclosure; defense testing and retesting; the admissibility
of DNA evidence; post-conviction testing; charting persons by DNA profile; and DNA
databases. Id.
140. Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, 262
Sc. AM. 5, 46, 48 (1990) (discussing how "[tihe ongoing debate over DNA testing
underscores the need to deal more effectively with the difficulties that arise whenever
complex scientific technology is introduced as evidence in a court of law").
141. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring).
142. Brief of New York County District Attorney's Office, supra note 119, at *5-9
(discussing the six-step process used by New York and private laboratories like Cellmark);
Garrett Epps, How Many DNA Techs Does It Take to Admit DNA Evidence, ATLANTIC (Dec.
7, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/how-many-dna-techs-does-ittake-to-admit-dna-evidence/249599/ (discussing the Supreme Court Justices' discussion
about needing twelve analysts or technicians to testify for a single DNA admission).
143. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
144. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
145. Jeffrey Fisher, The Holdingsand Implicationsof Williams v. Illinois, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2012, 2:20 PM), httpJ/www.scotusblog.com/?p=147095.
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E.

Why Does Science Need to Be Confronted?
Idealistically, scientific testimony of expert witnesses should be
confronted because the Constitution affords that right to each individual;
however, there are practical concerns when confronting scientific
testimony and using forensic evidence as basis evidence. People believe
scientific expert testimony, which makes cross-examination of these
witnesses a powerful tool for counsel and a necessary cross-examination
target for defendants. 4
Additionally, DNA testing is superior to the remaining forensic
tests. 47 In fact, a 2009 study of forensic evidence in wrongful convictions of individuals later exonerated by DNA evidence showed a systemic
breakdown for other forms of forensic testimony, finding: 1) misstated or
unsupported empirical data in 60% of cases where forensic analysts were
used by the prosecution; 2) issues with 72 different forensic analysts and
52 different laboratories, practices, or hospitals; and 3) problems from 25
different states. 148 However, Williams seems to treat all forensic
reports as acceptable basis evidence, creating another snag to limit its
49
holding.

Relationships between laboratories and police departments may create
potential prosecutorial biases of experts, 5 ° expounding the need for
cross-examination. 5 ' Most laboratories only examine evidence submit-

146. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it"); see also United States v. Frazier, 387
F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) ("E]xpert testimony may be assigned talismanic
significance in the eyes of lay jurors, and, therefore, the district courts must take care to
weigh the value of such evidence against its potential to mislead or confuse."); United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[A] certain patina attaches to an
expert's testimony unlike any other witness; this is 'science,' a professional's judgment, the
jury may think, and give more credence to the testimony than it may deserve."); Brandon
L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 97 (2009) (noting juries may give special weight to forensic
testimony).
147. See Nat'l Research Council, Nat'lAcad. of Sciences, StrengtheningForensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) (publishing a scathing article about the
reliability and techniques of forensic analysis other than nuclear DNA testing after
Congress granted the Council funds to conduct a study on forensic analysis).
148. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 146, at 2.
149. See Ryan M. Goldstein, Improving Forensic Science Through State Oversight, 90
TEx. L. REV. 225, 226-28 (2011).
150. Giannelli, supra note 128, at 467-69 (discussing the need for independent crime
labs by remarking that there is "'unequivocal evidence that the pro-prosecution orientation
of government scientists... had not adequately been countered in England").
151. Murphy, supra note 127, at 747-48.
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ted by the prosecution and up to 83% of laboratories are publicly
funded. 152 Further, defense counsel may lack funds to hire an expert
to dispute forensic evidence, which further distances the defense from
forensic evidence; 5 ' however, in instances where the defense attempts
to undermine the reliability of this evidence, as in Williams, judges
By limiting the procedural
seldom exclude the forensic evidence.'
may continue to distance
Williams
application of cross-examination,
55
evidence.'
forensic
from
indigent defendants
F How Does Williams Change Expert Testimony About Forensic
Evidence?
Given the speculation surrounding the Court's grant of certiorari to
Williams, many thought the Court would reverse its Confrontation
Clause standard.'56 Instead, the Court created a prosecution-friendly
57 Wilexception to the rule it created within the past three years.'
liams limited defendants' rights, but it failed to provide a single,
majority rationale on how courts should handle the use of forensic
evidence. 5 8
Reflecting on the Court's acceptance of three cases within three years
and the fractured opinion, a future case concerning expert forensic
testimony will certainly pose another opportunity for the Court to

152. Durose et al., supra note 118, at 1.
153. Hoeffel, supra note 7, at 521-22.
154. See Neufeld & Colman, supra note 140, at 49 ("Often judges think-mistakenly,
in our opinion-that justice is best served by admitting expert testimony into evidence and
deferring to the jury for the determination of its weight.").
155. Id. at 52-53 (discussing the difficulties facing defense counsel who attempted to
find experts to rebut forensic evidence: lack of funds; lack of attorney knowledge and time
to understand the complexity of science; and expert refusal out of fear their testimony will
be misconstrued as an attack on the science).
156. Tom Goldstein, Argument Preview: Closer to the Margins of the Confrontation
Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 5, 2011, 3:42 pm) http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=133417 (noting
the changing composition of the Court since it first decided Crawford and the following
Confrontation Clause cases).
157. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Supports Prosecutors in DNA Lab
Report Case;Expert Testimony Allowed, A.B.A. J. (June 18, 2012), http'J/www.abajoumnal
.com/news/article/supreme-court-supports-prsecutors-in-dna-ab-report-case-experttestimony/ (noting how prosecutors got a boost from the Williams opinion).
158. Adam Liptack, No MajorityRationale in Crime Lab Testimony Ruling, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18,2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/us/supreme-court-ruling-on-crime-labtestimony-lacks-majority-rationale.html?r=0 (discussing how the badly fractured opinion
"seemed to retreat from a groundbreaking decision in 2009 that said crime lab reports may
not be used in criminal trials unless the analysts responsible for creating them provide live
testimony").
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provide a clear-cut rule or change its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
NATASHA CRAWFORD
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the Annual Survey of Georgia Law ($15.00), to the Annual Eleventh Circuit

Survey ($15.00), and to both Survey issues ($30.00). Subscriptions are payable in advance and are renewed automatically unless notice to the contrary is
received by August 1st. Single copies of the Lead and Articles issues are
available at $15.00 each. Subscriptions to only the Lead and Articles issues
are not available. Single copies of the Survey issues are available at $15.00
each; orders must be clearly marked "Single Copy." Georgia residents should
add the appropriate state, local, and special district taxes. All domestic
subscriptions are sent via periodicals mail. Foreign subscriptions are sent via
surface mail. Subscribe online at http://www.law.mercer.edu/academics/law
review/subscribe.cfm
BACK ISSUES, REPRINTS, AND MICROFILM. For back stock, reprints, or microfilm of
Mercer Law Review, contact: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main Street,

Buffalo, NY 14209 or call (800) 828-7571 or (716) 882-2600.
COPIES. Replacement copies will be sent to subscribers
who report missing or imperfect copies of Mercer Law Review within six
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months of the publication date. Mercer Law Review regrets that it cannot
replace copies not reported missing or imperfect within six months of
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UNSOLICITED MANUSCRIPTS. Mercer Law Review welcomes the submission of unsolicited manuscripts. Submissions should be triple-spaced. Citations should
conform to THE BLUEBOOK (19th ed. 2010). Please enclose a self-addressed,
stamped envelope for acknowledgment. Mercer Law Review will endeavor to
notify authors of its decision within six weeks. Manuscripts will not be returned unless sufficient return postage is included with the original
submission. Please address unsolicited manuscripts to: Articles Editor, Mer-

cer Law Review, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, Macon,
Georgia 31207. Unsolicited manuscripts can be submitted online at http://
www.law.mercer. edu/academics/lawreview/index.cfm
MICROFORMS. Microform reproductions of all volumes of Mercer Law Review are
available from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, or 30/32 Mortimer Street, London WIN 7RA,
England.
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casenote, or comment in this issue of MercerLaw Review grants permission to
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copy.
CARL VINSON MEMORIAL LECTURE. The annual Carl Vinson Memorial Lecture
Series was created in 1982 in honor and memory of the Honorable Carl
Vinson, a distinguished alumnus of the Mercer Law School who served his
country for fifty years as a member of Congress. The purpose of the Lecture
Series is to provide lectures of the very highest quality on legal and law-

related subjects for the students and faculty of the law school, alumni and
friends of the School of Law and Mercer University, and the general public.
The Vinson Lectures are periodically published in Mercer Law Review.
MERCER LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION. All alumni of Mercer Law Review are mem-

bers of the Mercer Law Review Association. Friends of Mercer Law Review
may become adjunct members of the Mercer Law Review Association by
application.
DISCLAIMER OF OPINION. Opinions expressed in any part of MERCER LAW REVIEW
are those of the individual contributors and are not presented as the views of
Mercer Law Review, the Walter F. George School of Law, or Mercer
University.

WALTER F. GEORGE SCHOOL OF LAW
MERCER UNIVERSITY

The Walter F. George School of Law of Mercer University is located in Macon, Georgia, about 80 miles south of Atlanta. Founded in
1873, it is one of the oldest private law schools in the nation. Named for a
distinguished alumnus who served as a United States senator for 36 years,
the school became a member of the AALS in 1923 and has been ABAapproved since 1925. With its distinctive Woodruff Curriculum and a total
student body of roughly 440, Mercer Law School provides an educational environment that offers in-depth learning, a candid and lively exchange of views,
and a genuine sense of community and collegiality.

GENERAL INFORMATION.

DEGREES AWARDED. The study of law at the Walter F. George School of Law

consists of a three-year program directed toward the J.D. degree. Ajoint J.D.M.B.A. program is offered in conjunction with the School of Business and Economics. In addition, the law school offers a Business Certificate Program and
a Legal Writing Certificate Program. The Law School also has initiated its
first Master of Laws Degree, an LL.M. Degree in Federal Criminal Practice
and Procedure. Please see our website for more details at
www.law.mercer.edu.
ADMISSIONS. As a top provider of legal education, Mercer Law School is selective
in admissions. Each year, many highly qualified college graduates apply for a
limited number of seats in the first-year class. Our admissions process aims
to select from the applicant pool students who will contribute to our academic
community during their three years of legal education and, ultimately, to society and the legal profession. Persons interested in applying for admission to
the Walter F. George School of Law may access information at www.law.
mercer.edu or email the Admissions Office at admissions@law.mercer.edu.
You may also contact us directly at 478-301-2605. Any correspondence by
mail should be addressed to: Mercer University School of Law, Office of
Admissions, 1021 Georgia Avenue, Macon, Georgia 31207.
LAW LIBRARY. The Furman Smith Law Library has a staff of fifteen, including
five professional librarians. The librarians provide extensive instruction in

both print and electronic research as part of the curriculum. The library's
collection includes over 350,000 volumes in books and microforms as well as a
wide array of legal and non-legal electronic resources. Carrels, tables, soft
seating, "smart" study rooms and a technology lounge are available to law
students. Throughout the library and law school, students have wireless
access to the library and law school network via their personal laptops. The
library's web site features an extensive collection of annotated links to Georgia and federal legal research materials. For more information about the library visit http://law.mercer.edu/library.
CAREER SERVICES OFFICE. Employers who are interested in interviewing students and graduates of the Walter F. George School of Law are invited to
contact the Career Services Office. Upon request, the Career Services Office
will be happy to forward resumes, arrange on-campus interviews, or assist
employers in any other way. Address correspondence to: Career Services
Office, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, 1021 Georgia Avenue, Macon, Georgia 31207. Telephone (478) 301-2615. FAX (478) 301-2287.
Employers may also contact the Career Services Office via email at
careerservices@law.mercer.edu.
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